An introduction to the structural econometrics of auction data /
Paarsch, Harry J.
An introduction to the structural econometrics of auction data / Harry J. Paarsch, Han Hong ; with contributions by M. Ryan Haley. - Cambridge : The MIT Press, 2006. - xxv, 422 páginas : gráficas ; 24 cm. + 1 CD-ROM - Economics. Finance .
Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas 327-336) e índice.
Introduction: An example ; Some intriguing problems ; Plan of book ; Practice problems -- Overview of auction theory: Auction formats and rules ; Information structure ; Bidder preferences ; Purposeful bidding and game equilibrium ; A binding reserve price ; Expected revenues and optimal auctions ; Winner’s curse ; Practice problems -- Vickrey and english auctions: Nonparametric identification and estimation ; Covariates ; Single-index models : semiparametric estimation ; Reserve prices and parametric estimation ; Policy application ; Incomplete data ; Incomplete inference ; Asymmetric bidders ; Practice problems -- First-price, sealed-bid and dutch auctions: Deriving the data-generating process; Identification and estimation: simplest case ; Binding reserve price ; Risk-averse bidders ; Stochastic private values ; Asymmetric bidders ; Policy experiment ; Endogenous bidding participation ; Practice problems -- Multi-unit auctions: Weber’s classification system ; Pricing rules ; Singleton demand ; Multi-unit demand ; Sequential, clock auctions: random demand ; Sequential, clock auctions: nonrandom demand ; Practice problems -- Directions for further research: Simulataneous, dependeny, sealed-bid auctions ; Infinitely lived uction games ; Multi-object auctions ; Sumary -- Appendixes -- References.
0262162350 9780262162357
Economía--Métodos estadísticos
Subastas--Modelos econométricos
381.17015195 / P11i
An introduction to the structural econometrics of auction data / Harry J. Paarsch, Han Hong ; with contributions by M. Ryan Haley. - Cambridge : The MIT Press, 2006. - xxv, 422 páginas : gráficas ; 24 cm. + 1 CD-ROM - Economics. Finance .
Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas 327-336) e índice.
Introduction: An example ; Some intriguing problems ; Plan of book ; Practice problems -- Overview of auction theory: Auction formats and rules ; Information structure ; Bidder preferences ; Purposeful bidding and game equilibrium ; A binding reserve price ; Expected revenues and optimal auctions ; Winner’s curse ; Practice problems -- Vickrey and english auctions: Nonparametric identification and estimation ; Covariates ; Single-index models : semiparametric estimation ; Reserve prices and parametric estimation ; Policy application ; Incomplete data ; Incomplete inference ; Asymmetric bidders ; Practice problems -- First-price, sealed-bid and dutch auctions: Deriving the data-generating process; Identification and estimation: simplest case ; Binding reserve price ; Risk-averse bidders ; Stochastic private values ; Asymmetric bidders ; Policy experiment ; Endogenous bidding participation ; Practice problems -- Multi-unit auctions: Weber’s classification system ; Pricing rules ; Singleton demand ; Multi-unit demand ; Sequential, clock auctions: random demand ; Sequential, clock auctions: nonrandom demand ; Practice problems -- Directions for further research: Simulataneous, dependeny, sealed-bid auctions ; Infinitely lived uction games ; Multi-object auctions ; Sumary -- Appendixes -- References.
0262162350 9780262162357
Economía--Métodos estadísticos
Subastas--Modelos econométricos
381.17015195 / P11i