Game theory /
Fudenberg, Drew
Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole. - Cambridge ; London : The MIT Press, 1993. - xxiii, 579 páginas : gráficas, tablas ; 26 cm.
Incluye bibliografías e índice.
I. Static games of complete information ; 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium ; 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information ; 3. Extensive-form games ; 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions ; 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information ; 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium ; 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information ; 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection ; 9. Reputation effects ; 10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics ; 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance ; 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games ; 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium ; 14. Common knowledge and games.
0262061414
519.3 / F83g
Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole. - Cambridge ; London : The MIT Press, 1993. - xxiii, 579 páginas : gráficas, tablas ; 26 cm.
Incluye bibliografías e índice.
I. Static games of complete information ; 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium ; 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information ; 3. Extensive-form games ; 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions ; 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information ; 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium ; 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information ; 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection ; 9. Reputation effects ; 10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics ; 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance ; 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games ; 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium ; 14. Common knowledge and games.
0262061414
519.3 / F83g