Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program /
Zhang, C. Yiwei.
Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program / C. Yiwei Zhang, Jeffrey Hemmeter, Judd B. Kessler, Robert D. Metcalfe, Robert Weathers. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w27875 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w27875. .
September 2020.
We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content--providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties--had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program / C. Yiwei Zhang, Jeffrey Hemmeter, Judd B. Kessler, Robert D. Metcalfe, Robert Weathers. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w27875 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w27875. .
September 2020.
We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content--providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties--had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.