Fencing Off Silicon Valley: Cross-Border Venture Capital and Technology Spillovers /
Akcigit, Ufuk.
Fencing Off Silicon Valley: Cross-Border Venture Capital and Technology Spillovers / Ufuk Akcigit, Sina T. Ates, Josh Lerner, Richard R. Townsend, Yulia Zhestkova. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w27828 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w27828. .
September 2020.
The treatment of foreign investors is a contentious topic in U.S. entrepreneurship policy. We model a setting where foreign corporate investments in Silicon Valley may allow U.S. entrepreneurs to pursue technologies that they could not otherwise, but may also lead to knowledge spillovers. We show that despite the benefits from such inbound investments for U.S. firms, it may be optimal for the U.S. government to raise their costs to deter investments. Using as comprehensive as possible a sample of investments by foreign corporate investors in U.S. startups, we find evidence consistent with the presence of knowledge spillovers to foreign investors.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Fencing Off Silicon Valley: Cross-Border Venture Capital and Technology Spillovers / Ufuk Akcigit, Sina T. Ates, Josh Lerner, Richard R. Townsend, Yulia Zhestkova. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w27828 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w27828. .
September 2020.
The treatment of foreign investors is a contentious topic in U.S. entrepreneurship policy. We model a setting where foreign corporate investments in Silicon Valley may allow U.S. entrepreneurs to pursue technologies that they could not otherwise, but may also lead to knowledge spillovers. We show that despite the benefits from such inbound investments for U.S. firms, it may be optimal for the U.S. government to raise their costs to deter investments. Using as comprehensive as possible a sample of investments by foreign corporate investors in U.S. startups, we find evidence consistent with the presence of knowledge spillovers to foreign investors.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.