Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks /
Duarte, Raúl.
Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks / Raúl Duarte, Frederico Finan, Horacio Larreguy, Laura Schechter. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w26241 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26241. .
September 2019.
Throughout much of the developing world, politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes prior to elections. We investigate how social networks help facilitate vote-buying exchanges by combining village network data of brokers and voters with broker reports of vote buying. We show that networks diffuse politically-relevant information about voters to brokers who leverage it to target voters. In particular, we find that brokers target reciprocal voters who are not registered to their party and about whom they can hear more information through their social network. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying and ultimately for political outcomes.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks / Raúl Duarte, Frederico Finan, Horacio Larreguy, Laura Schechter. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w26241 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26241. .
September 2019.
Throughout much of the developing world, politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes prior to elections. We investigate how social networks help facilitate vote-buying exchanges by combining village network data of brokers and voters with broker reports of vote buying. We show that networks diffuse politically-relevant information about voters to brokers who leverage it to target voters. In particular, we find that brokers target reciprocal voters who are not registered to their party and about whom they can hear more information through their social network. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying and ultimately for political outcomes.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.