Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments /

Aryal, Gaurab.

Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments / Gaurab Aryal, Manudeep Bhuller, Fabian Lange. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w25885 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w25885. .

May 2019.

This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across non-central and central municipalities in Norway to construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9%, of which 70% is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30% is due to signaling.




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