Two-sided Altruism and Signaling /
Genicot, Garance.
Two-sided Altruism and Signaling / Garance Genicot. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w21309 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21309. .
June 2015.
This paper shows that when donors and recipients care about each other --two-sided altruism -- the presence of asymmetry of information about the donor's income leads very naturally to a signaling game. A donor who cares about the recipient's welfare has incentives to appear richer than he is when the recipient cares about him. Similarly, asymmetry of information regarding the donor's income generates a signaling game in the presence of two-sided altruism. These signaling games put upward pressure on transfers and this pressure increases with the altruism of the recipient.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Two-sided Altruism and Signaling / Garance Genicot. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w21309 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21309. .
June 2015.
This paper shows that when donors and recipients care about each other --two-sided altruism -- the presence of asymmetry of information about the donor's income leads very naturally to a signaling game. A donor who cares about the recipient's welfare has incentives to appear richer than he is when the recipient cares about him. Similarly, asymmetry of information regarding the donor's income generates a signaling game in the presence of two-sided altruism. These signaling games put upward pressure on transfers and this pressure increases with the altruism of the recipient.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.