Competition and Bank Opacity /
Jiang, Liangliang.
Competition and Bank Opacity / Liangliang Jiang, Ross Levine, Chen Lin. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w20760 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20760. .
December 2014.
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Competition and Bank Opacity / Liangliang Jiang, Ross Levine, Chen Lin. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w20760 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20760. .
December 2014.
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.