Private Politics and Public Regulation /
Egorov, Georgy.
Private Politics and Public Regulation / Georgy Egorov, Bård Harstad. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w19737 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19737. .
December 2013.
We develop a dynamic game to explore the interaction between regulation and private policies, such as self-regulation by firms and activism. Without a public regulator, the possibility of self-regulation is bad for the firm, but good for activists who are willing to maintain a costly boycott to raise the likelihood of self-regulation. Results are reversed when the regulator is present: the firm then self-regulates to preempt public regulation, while activists start and continue boycotts to raise the likelihood of such regulation. Our analytical results describe when a boycott is likely, and when it may be expected to be short and/or successful. The model generates a rich set of testable comparative statics.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Private Politics and Public Regulation / Georgy Egorov, Bård Harstad. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w19737 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19737. .
December 2013.
We develop a dynamic game to explore the interaction between regulation and private policies, such as self-regulation by firms and activism. Without a public regulator, the possibility of self-regulation is bad for the firm, but good for activists who are willing to maintain a costly boycott to raise the likelihood of self-regulation. Results are reversed when the regulator is present: the firm then self-regulates to preempt public regulation, while activists start and continue boycotts to raise the likelihood of such regulation. Our analytical results describe when a boycott is likely, and when it may be expected to be short and/or successful. The model generates a rich set of testable comparative statics.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.