Deals Not Done: Sources of Failure in the Market for Ideas /
Agrawal, Ajay.
Deals Not Done: Sources of Failure in the Market for Ideas / Ajay Agrawal, Iain Cockburn, Laurina Zhang. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w19679 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19679. .
November 2013.
Using novel survey data on technology licensing, we report the first empirical evidence linking the three main sources of failure emphasized in the market design literature (lack of market thickness, congestion, lack of market safety) to deal outcomes. We disaggregate the licensing process into three stages and find that although lack of market thickness and deal failure are correlated in the first stage, they are not in the latter stages, underscoring the bilateral monopoly conditions under which negotiations over intellectual property often occur. In contrast, market safety is only salient in the final stage. Several commonly referenced bargaining frictions (congestion) are salient, particularly in the second stage. Also, universities and firms differ in the stage during which they are most likely to experience deal failure.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Deals Not Done: Sources of Failure in the Market for Ideas / Ajay Agrawal, Iain Cockburn, Laurina Zhang. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w19679 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19679. .
November 2013.
Using novel survey data on technology licensing, we report the first empirical evidence linking the three main sources of failure emphasized in the market design literature (lack of market thickness, congestion, lack of market safety) to deal outcomes. We disaggregate the licensing process into three stages and find that although lack of market thickness and deal failure are correlated in the first stage, they are not in the latter stages, underscoring the bilateral monopoly conditions under which negotiations over intellectual property often occur. In contrast, market safety is only salient in the final stage. Several commonly referenced bargaining frictions (congestion) are salient, particularly in the second stage. Also, universities and firms differ in the stage during which they are most likely to experience deal failure.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.