Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service /
Hanna, Rema.
Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service / Rema Hanna, Shing-Yi Wang. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w19649 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19649. .
November 2013.
In this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service / Rema Hanna, Shing-Yi Wang. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w19649 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19649. .
November 2013.
In this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.