Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments /
Ferraz, Claudio.
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments / Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w14937 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14937. .
April 2009.
Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments / Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w14937 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14937. .
April 2009.
Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.