Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences /
Niederle, Muriel.
Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences / Muriel Niederle, Leeat Yariv. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w14840 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14840. .
April 2009.
We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences / Muriel Niederle, Leeat Yariv. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w14840 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14840. .
April 2009.
We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.