Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions /

Bulow, Jeremy.

Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions / Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w14765 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14765. .

March 2009.

We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars.




System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Powered by Koha