Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs /
Mortimer, Julie Holland.
Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs / Julie Holland Mortimer. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w11676 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w11676. .
October 2005.
This paper examines the welfare effects of intellectual property protection, accounting for firms' optimal responses to legal environments and technological innovation. I examine firms' use of indirect price discrimination in response to U.S. copyright law, which effectively prevents direct price discrimination. Using data covering VHS and DVD movie distribution, I explain studios' optimal pricing strategies under U.S. copyright law, and determine optimal pricing strategies under E.U. copyright law, which allows for direct price discrimination. I analyze these optimal pricing strategies for both the existing VHS technology and the new digital DVD technology. I find that studios' use of indirect price discrimination under US copyright law benefits consumers and harms retailers. Optimal pricing under E.U. copyright law also tends to benefit studios and consumers. I also reanalyze these issues assuming continued DVD adoption.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs / Julie Holland Mortimer. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w11676 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w11676. .
October 2005.
This paper examines the welfare effects of intellectual property protection, accounting for firms' optimal responses to legal environments and technological innovation. I examine firms' use of indirect price discrimination in response to U.S. copyright law, which effectively prevents direct price discrimination. Using data covering VHS and DVD movie distribution, I explain studios' optimal pricing strategies under U.S. copyright law, and determine optimal pricing strategies under E.U. copyright law, which allows for direct price discrimination. I analyze these optimal pricing strategies for both the existing VHS technology and the new digital DVD technology. I find that studios' use of indirect price discrimination under US copyright law benefits consumers and harms retailers. Optimal pricing under E.U. copyright law also tends to benefit studios and consumers. I also reanalyze these issues assuming continued DVD adoption.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.