Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits /
Gruber, Jonathan.
Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits / Jonathan Gruber. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2000. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w7553 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w7553. .
February 2000.
The continued rise in the number of non-elderly Americans without health insurance has led to considerable interest in tax-based policies to raise the level of insurance coverage. This paper describes a detailed microsimulation model that has been developed to evaluate such tax-based polices, and its findings for the impact of polices on government costs and insurance coverage. I find that while tax subsidies could significantly increase insurance coverage, even very generous tax policies could not cover more than a sizable minority of the uninsured population. But there are several design features which can clearly make tax policy more effective: using tax credits rather than deductions; making credits refundable; and addressing the timing mismatch between when insurance purchases are made and tax refunds are received. I also document a clear tradeoff between the scope of tax subsidies and their efficiency.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits / Jonathan Gruber. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2000. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w7553 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w7553. .
February 2000.
The continued rise in the number of non-elderly Americans without health insurance has led to considerable interest in tax-based policies to raise the level of insurance coverage. This paper describes a detailed microsimulation model that has been developed to evaluate such tax-based polices, and its findings for the impact of polices on government costs and insurance coverage. I find that while tax subsidies could significantly increase insurance coverage, even very generous tax policies could not cover more than a sizable minority of the uninsured population. But there are several design features which can clearly make tax policy more effective: using tax credits rather than deductions; making credits refundable; and addressing the timing mismatch between when insurance purchases are made and tax refunds are received. I also document a clear tradeoff between the scope of tax subsidies and their efficiency.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.