Self-fulfillment Expectations, Speculation Attacks, and Capitol Controls /

Dellas, Harris.

Self-fulfillment Expectations, Speculation Attacks, and Capitol Controls / Harris Dellas, Alan C. Stockman. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w2625 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2625. .

June 1988.

This paper examines the endogenous implementation of capital controls in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime. It is shown that if there exists a non-zero probability that the policymaker's response to a speculative attack on official foreign reserves will be the introduction of controls, such an attack may occur even when current and expected monetary policy is consistent with a permanently viable, control-free fixed exchange rate regime. Consequently, capital controls may be the outcome of self- fulfilling expectations rather than the result of imprudent economic policies.




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