Optimal Funding and Asset Allocation Rules for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans /
Harrison, J. Michael.
Optimal Funding and Asset Allocation Rules for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans / J. Michael Harrison, William F. Sharpe. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1982. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w0935 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w0935. .
July 1982.
This paper considers a world in which pension funds may default, the cost of the associated risk of default is not borne fully by the sponsoring corporation, and there are differential tax effects. The focus is on ways in which the wealth of the shareholders of a corporation sponsoring a pension plan might be increased if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) follow simple and naive policies. Under the conditions examined, the optimal policy for pension plan funding and asset allocation is shown to be extremal in a certain sense. This suggests that the IRS and the PBGC may wish to use more complex regulatory procedures than those considered in the paper.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Optimal Funding and Asset Allocation Rules for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans / J. Michael Harrison, William F. Sharpe. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1982. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w0935 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w0935. .
July 1982.
This paper considers a world in which pension funds may default, the cost of the associated risk of default is not borne fully by the sponsoring corporation, and there are differential tax effects. The focus is on ways in which the wealth of the shareholders of a corporation sponsoring a pension plan might be increased if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) follow simple and naive policies. Under the conditions examined, the optimal policy for pension plan funding and asset allocation is shown to be extremal in a certain sense. This suggests that the IRS and the PBGC may wish to use more complex regulatory procedures than those considered in the paper.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.