Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /
Felsenthal, Dan S.
Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / [electronic resource] : by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi. - 1st ed. 2018. - XV, 134 p. online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Economics, 2191-5504 . - SpringerBriefs in Economics, .
Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.
This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
9783319740331
10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1 doi
Welfare economics.
Elections.
Political philosophy.
Economic theory.
Democracy.
Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.
Electoral Politics.
Political Philosophy.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
Democracy.
HB846-846.8
302.1
Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / [electronic resource] : by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi. - 1st ed. 2018. - XV, 134 p. online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Economics, 2191-5504 . - SpringerBriefs in Economics, .
Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.
This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
9783319740331
10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1 doi
Welfare economics.
Elections.
Political philosophy.
Economic theory.
Democracy.
Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.
Electoral Politics.
Political Philosophy.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
Democracy.
HB846-846.8
302.1