Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions

Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions [electronic resource] / edited by M. Bacharach, Louis André Gerard-Varet, Philippe Mongin, H.S. Shin. - 1st ed. 1997. - XXXIV, 366 p. online resource. - Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization, 20 0924-6126 ; . - Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization, 20 .

I Iterated Knowledge and Common Knowledge -- 1 On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge -- 2 A Complete Epistemic Logic for Multiple Agents -- 3 Axiomatic Indefinability of Common Knowledge in Finitary Logics -- 4 Eliminating Redundancies in Partition Spaces -- II The Logical Omniscience Problem -- 5 From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical Competence -- 6 Knowledge and Belief Representation in a Partial Model -- 7 Awareness and Partitional Informational Structures -- 8 Representing the Knowledge of Turing Machines -- III Applications to Game Theory and Decision Theory -- 9 Logics for Nonomniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach -- 10 Alternative Definitions of Knowledge -- 11 Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games -- 12 Analyzing Games by Sequences of Metatheories -- 13 Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Noncooperative Games -- 14 The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game -- 15 On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts.

9781461311393

10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3 doi


Economic theory.
Economic history.
Epistemology.
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
History of Economic Thought/Methodology.
Epistemology.

HB1-846.8

330.1

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