Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives /
Anton, Miguel.
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives / Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gine, Martin C. Schmalz. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w30785 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30785. .
December 2022.
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with more common ownership.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Firm Behavior: Theory
Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
Compensation Packages • Payment Methods
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Business Objectives of the Firm
Personnel Management • Executives; Executive Compensation
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives / Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gine, Martin C. Schmalz. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w30785 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30785. .
December 2022.
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with more common ownership.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Firm Behavior: Theory
Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
Compensation Packages • Payment Methods
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Business Objectives of the Firm
Personnel Management • Executives; Executive Compensation