Restrict the Middleman? Quantitative Models of PBM Regulations and Their Consequences /
Mulligan, Casey B.
Restrict the Middleman? Quantitative Models of PBM Regulations and Their Consequences / Casey B. Mulligan. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w30998 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30998. .
March 2023.
This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous economic interpretation is provided for what are sometimes called "rebate walls" or "rebate traps." Applicable types of regulation include rebate rules, such as the HHS rebate rule and the Insulin Act; disclosure requirements such as the PBM Transparency Act of 2023; and pharmacy contract restrictions such as the CMS Medicare rule to take effect in 2024. Utilization of brands and generics, plan spending, cost sharing, spillovers to nonpharmacy medical spending, government budgets, and the pace of drug innovation are among the outcomes tracked by the open-source model.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
Economics of Regulation
Restrict the Middleman? Quantitative Models of PBM Regulations and Their Consequences / Casey B. Mulligan. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w30998 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30998. .
March 2023.
This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous economic interpretation is provided for what are sometimes called "rebate walls" or "rebate traps." Applicable types of regulation include rebate rules, such as the HHS rebate rule and the Insulin Act; disclosure requirements such as the PBM Transparency Act of 2023; and pharmacy contract restrictions such as the CMS Medicare rule to take effect in 2024. Utilization of brands and generics, plan spending, cost sharing, spillovers to nonpharmacy medical spending, government budgets, and the pace of drug innovation are among the outcomes tracked by the open-source model.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
Economics of Regulation