Monopsony, Efficiency, and the Regularization of Undocumented Immigrants /
Borjas, George J.
Monopsony, Efficiency, and the Regularization of Undocumented Immigrants / George J. Borjas, Anthony Edo. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w31457 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w31457. .
July 2023.
In May 1981, President François Mitterrand regularized the status of undocumented immigrant workers in France. The newly legalized immigrants represented 12 percent of the non-French workforce and about 1 percent of all workers. Employers have monopsony power over undocumented workers because the undocumented may find it costly to participate in the open labor market and have restricted economic opportunities. By alleviating this labor market imperfection, a regularization program can move the market closer to the efficient competitive equilibrium and potentially increase employment and wages for both the newly legalized and the authorized workforce. Our empirical analysis reveals that the Mitterrand regularization program particularly increased employment and wages for low-skill native and immigrant men, and raised French GDP by over 1 percent.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials
Monopsony • Segmented Labor Markets
Geographic Labor Mobility • Immigrant Workers
Monopsony, Efficiency, and the Regularization of Undocumented Immigrants / George J. Borjas, Anthony Edo. - Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023. - 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white); - NBER working paper series no. w31457 . - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w31457. .
July 2023.
In May 1981, President François Mitterrand regularized the status of undocumented immigrant workers in France. The newly legalized immigrants represented 12 percent of the non-French workforce and about 1 percent of all workers. Employers have monopsony power over undocumented workers because the undocumented may find it costly to participate in the open labor market and have restricted economic opportunities. By alleviating this labor market imperfection, a regularization program can move the market closer to the efficient competitive equilibrium and potentially increase employment and wages for both the newly legalized and the authorized workforce. Our empirical analysis reveals that the Mitterrand regularization program particularly increased employment and wages for low-skill native and immigrant men, and raised French GDP by over 1 percent.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials
Monopsony • Segmented Labor Markets
Geographic Labor Mobility • Immigrant Workers