Image from Google Jackets

Classics in game theory.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Series: Frontiers of economic researchPublication details: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1997.Edition: Edited by Harold W. KuhnDescription: xv, 362 páginas : gráficas, tablas ; 24 cmContent type:
  • Texto
Media type:
  • Sin mediación
Carrier type:
  • Volumen
ISBN:
  • 0691011931
  • 0691011923
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 519.3  C51 21
Other classification:
  • C70
Contents:
1. Equilibrium points in n-person games / John F. Nash, Jr ; 2. The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr ; 3. Non-cooperative games / John Nash ; 4. An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson ; 5. Equivalence of games in extensive form / F. B. Thompson ; 6. Extensive games and the problem and information / H. W. Kuhn ; 7. A value for n-person games / L. S. Shapley ; 8. Stochastic games / L. S. Shapley ; 9. Recursive games / H. Everett ; 10. Von neumann-morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg ; 11. A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf ; 12. The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler ; 13. Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann ; 14. The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf ; 15. Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players. part i: the basic model / John C. Harsanyi ; 16. The big match / David Blackwell and T. S. Ferguson ; 17. On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik ; 18. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Incluye bibliografías e índice.

1. Equilibrium points in n-person games / John F. Nash, Jr ; 2. The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr ; 3. Non-cooperative games / John Nash ; 4. An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson ; 5. Equivalence of games in extensive form / F. B. Thompson ; 6. Extensive games and the problem and information / H. W. Kuhn ; 7. A value for n-person games / L. S. Shapley ; 8. Stochastic games / L. S. Shapley ; 9. Recursive games / H. Everett ; 10. Von neumann-morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg ; 11. A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf ; 12. The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler ; 13. Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann ; 14. The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf ; 15. Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players. part i: the basic model / John C. Harsanyi ; 16. The big match / David Blackwell and T. S. Ferguson ; 17. On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik ; 18. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

Powered by Koha