Equity in theory and practice / H. Peyton Young.
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- Texto
- Sin mediación
- Volumen
- 0691043191
- 519.3 Y68e 21
- C7
Item type | Home library | Call number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
LIBRO FISICO | Biblioteca Principal | 519.3 Y68e (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan | Mantener en colección | 29004018965920 |
Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas 223-232) e índice.
Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Overview: 1. The division of common property ; 2. Micro vs macro justice ; 3. The terms of discussion ; 4. Normative theories of justice: Aristotle, Bentham; and Rawls ; 5. No envy ; 6. Distributive judgments and interpersonal comparisons ; 7. Why classical formulas fail ; 8. The priority principle ; 9. The consistency principle ; 10. When proportionality fails for divisible goods ; 11. Games of fair division ; 12. Equity and efficiency -- 2. Equity and priority: 1. Methods for distributing indivisible goods ; 2. The demobilization of U.S. soldiers at the end of world war II ; 3. The point system for allocating kidneys in the United States ; 4. General principles ; 5. Point systems ; 6. Participatory equity ; 7. Summary -- 3. Equity as near as may be: 1. The apportionment of indivisible goods ; 2. Apportionment in the United States ; 3. Statement of the problem ; 4. The methods of Hamilton and Jefferson ; 5. The bias of Jefferson’s methods ; 6. The methods of Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams ; 7. The standard two-state solution and its generalization ; 8. The Alabama paradox ; 9. The methods of Joseph Hill ; 10. Bias ; 11. Consistency and priority ; 12. Staying within the quota ; 13. The population paradox ; 14. Summary -- 4. Equity, equality, proportionality: 1. Aristotle’s equity principle ; 2. Claims problems ; 3. The contested garment rule ; 4. The shapely value ; 5. AN inconsistency in the shapely value ; 6. Maimonides’ rule ; 7. Gains vs. loss ; 8. Varieties of equality ; 9. Equity, priority, and consistency ; 10. Incentive effects ; 11. Summary -- 5. Cost sharing: 1. Sharing gains from cooperation ; 2. A cost-sharing problem between two towns ; 3. A cost-sharing problem among three towns ; 4. The cooperative game model ; 5. The Tennessee valley authority ; 6. The decomposition principle ; 7. The shapely value ; 8. Equitable core solutions: the nucleolus ; 9. Summary -- 6. Progressive taxation: 1. Historical background ; 2. The progressivity principle ; 3. The U.S. federal income tax ; 4. Redressing inequality ; 5. The benefit theory ; 6. Ability to pay and equal sacrifice ; 7. The effect of progressive taxation on work effort ; 8. Optimal taxation ; 9. The effect of taxation on risk-taking ; 10. Summary -- 7. Fair bargains: 1. Bargaining over common property ; 2. The bargaining set , 3. The coordination problem ; 4. Classical bargaining solutions: Nash and Kalai-smorodinsky ; 5. Framing effects ; 6. Equity criteria based on tangible claims ; 7. Experimental results on bargaining ; 8. Empirical evidence from sharecropping practices ; 9. Summary -- 8. Fair process: 1. Games of fair division ; 2. Auctioning indivisibles ; 3. Superior and inferior modes of division ; 4. Divide and choose ; 5. The divider’s advantage ; 6. Removing the divider’s advantage by lottery ; 7. Successively splitting the difference: the raffia solution ; 8. Alternating offers: the Nash solution ; 9. Bidding to be divider: the egalitarian solution -- 9. Equity, envy, and efficiency: 1. Fair and efficient exchange ; 2. Transparent inequity , 3.3 Egalitarianism ; 4. A difficulty with egalitarianism ; 5. Competitive allocations ; 6. Progressive taxation: 1. Historical background ; 2. The progressivity principle ; 3. The U.S. federal income tax ; 4. Redressing inequality ; 5. The benefit theory ; 6. Ability to pay and equal sacrifice ; 7. The effect of progressive taxation on work effort ; 8. Optimal taxation ; 9. The effect of taxation on risk-taking ; 10. Summary -- 7. Fair-bargains: 1. Bargaining over common property ; 2. The bargaining set ; 3. The coordination problem ; 4. Classical bargaining solutions: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky ; 5. Framing effects ; 6. Equity criteria based on tangible claims ; 7. Experimental results on bargaining ; 8. Empirical evidence from sharecropping practices ; 9. Summary -- 8. Fair process: 1. Games of fair division ; 2. Auctioning indivisibles ; 3. Superior and inferior modes of division ; 4. Divide and choose ; 5. The dividers’ advantage ; 6. Removing the divider’s advantage by llotery ; 7. Successively splitting the difference: the raffia solution ; 8. Alternating offers: the Nash solution ; 9. Bidding to be divider: the egalitarian solution ; 10. Summary -- 9. Equity, envy, and efficiency: 1. Fair and efficient exchange ; 2. Transparent inequity ; 3. Egalitarianism ; 4. A difficulty with egalitarianism ; 5. Competitive allocations -, 6. The equity of competitive allocation ; 7. The competitive standard of comparison ; 8. Enlarging the pie ; 9. An application: assigning students to dormitories ; 10. Restricting the domain of exchange ; 11. Summary -- 10. Conclusion -- Appendix : The mathematical theory of equity: A.1. Two fundamental principles ; A.2. Zero-one allocations ; A.3. Opinion aggregation ; A.4. Integer allocation ; A.5. Claims and liabilities ; A.6. Cooperative games ; A.7. Bargaining ; A.8. Multiple goods.
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