Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas 161-166) e índice.

1. Introduction and summary -- 2. One-shot games between two policymakers ; 2.1. Overview ; 2.2. The model ; 2.3. A world productivity disturbance. an example of a symmetric disturbance ; 2.4. A shift in demand. an example of a asymmetric disturbance -- 3. Three polymakers and coalitions ; 3.1. Overview ; 3.2. The three-country model ; 3.3. A world productivity disturbance. the impact effects and the externalities ; 3.4. The Nash-Nash equilibrium and the gain from European cooperation ; 3.5. The Cooperation-Nash equilibrium ; 3.6. Implications of some of the “Paradoxical” results ; 3.7. A disaggregation theorem for the two-country model -- 4. Trigger mechanisms and reputation in repeated games ; 4.1. Overview ; 4.2. Converting a one-shot productivity disturbance game into a repeated game ; 4.3. Trigger mechanisms in infinitely repeated games ; 4.4. Trigger mechanisms in finitely repeated games 4.5. Intertemporal games whose structure shifts from period to period -- 5. Time consistency and trigger mechanisms ; 5.1. Overview ; 5.2. The model with two-period wage contracts ; 5.3. One active policymaker and a single one-period productivity disturbance ; 5.4. One active policymaker and repeated one-period productivity disturbance ; 5.5. Two active policymaker and a single one-period productivity disturbance ; 5.6. Two active policymaker and repeated one-period productivity disturbances -- 6. Concluding comments ; Appendixes ; A. The irrelevance of future money supplies with one-period wage contracts ; B. Wage setters’ expectations with Nash policymakers ; C. The asymmetric information Nash solution ; D. An example with a fixed point for F(h).