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Dynamic incentives and the optimal delegation of political power / Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: Continuing resourceContinuing resourceLanguage: English Series: FMI. Documentos ; 14780 | FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 178/15Publication details: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2007.Description: 35 p. : il. ; 28 cmOther classification:
  • FMI 178
 In: FMI 178 FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 178/15.
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Holdings: FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 178/15.

Incluye bibliografía.

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