Climate Policy, Financial Frictions, and Transition Risk / Stefano Carattini, Garth Heutel, Givi Melkadze.
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Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w28525 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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March 2021.
We study climate and macroprudential policies in an economy with financial frictions. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring both a pollution market failure and a market failure in the financial sector, we explore transition risk - whether ambitious climate policy can lead to macroeconomic instability. It can, but the risk can be alleviated through macroprudential policies - taxes or subsidies on banks' assets. Then, we explore efficient climate and macroprudential policy in the long run and over business cycles. The presence of financial frictions affects the steady-state value and dynamic properties of the efficient carbon tax. Macroprudential policy alone, without a carbon tax, is not very effective at addressing the pollution externality.
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