How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some / Jeffrey Clemens, Joshua D. Gottlieb, Jeffrey Hicks.

By:

Clemens, Jeffrey

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w28062.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: Proposals to create a national health care plan such as "Medicare for All" rely heavily on reducing the prices that insurers pay for health care. These changes affect physicians' short-run incentives for care provision and may also change health care providers' incentives to invest in capacity, thereby influencing the availability of care in the long term. We provide evidence on these responses using a major Medicare payment change combined with survey data on physicians' time use. We find evidence that physicians increase their time spent on capacity building when remuneration increases, and that they are subsequently more willing to accept new patients---especially those who may be the residual claimants on marginal capacity. These forces imply that short-run supply curves likely differ from long-run supply curves. Policymakers need to account for how major changes to payment incentives would influence the investments that determine health system capacity.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w28062 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	nber w2806 Initial Public Offerings: Investor Behavior and Underpricing /	nber w28060 Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts and Earnings Dynamics /	nber w28061 Automation and the Future of Young Workers: Evidence from Telephone Operation in the Early 20th Century /	nber w28062 How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some /	nber w28063 FinTech Adoption and Household Risk-Taking /	nber w28064 Choices and Outcomes in Assignment Mechanisms: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys /	nber w28065 Stereotypes in Financial Literacy: Evidence from PISA /	Next

November 2020.

Proposals to create a national health care plan such as "Medicare for All" rely heavily on reducing the prices that insurers pay for health care. These changes affect physicians' short-run incentives for care provision and may also change health care providers' incentives to invest in capacity, thereby influencing the availability of care in the long term. We provide evidence on these responses using a major Medicare payment change combined with survey data on physicians' time use. We find evidence that physicians increase their time spent on capacity building when remuneration increases, and that they are subsequently more willing to accept new patients---especially those who may be the residual claimants on marginal capacity. These forces imply that short-run supply curves likely differ from long-run supply curves. Policymakers need to account for how major changes to payment incentives would influence the investments that determine health system capacity.