Manufacturing Risk-free Government Debt / Zhengyang Jiang, Hanno Lustig, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Mindy Z. Xiaolan.
Material type:
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w27786 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
September 2020.
Governments face a trade-off between insuring bondholders and insuring taxpayers against output shocks. If they insure bondholders by manufacturing risk-free zero-beta debt, then they can only provide limited insurance to taxpayers. Taxpayers will pay more taxes in bad times regardless of whether output shocks are permanent or temporary. Permanent shocks impute long-run output risk to the debt while transitory shocks impute interest rate risk, all of which must be offset through taxation to keep the debt safe. Conversely, if governments insure taxpayers against adverse macro shocks, then the debt becomes risky. Convenience yields on government debt temporarily alleviate the trade-off.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.