Trade, Unemployment, and Monetary Policy / Matteo Cacciatore, Fabio Ghironi.
Material type:
- E24 - Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity
- E32 - Business Fluctuations • Cycles
- E52 - Monetary Policy
- F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w27474 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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July 2020.
We study how trade linkages affect the conduct of monetary policy in a two-country model with heterogeneous firms, endogenous producer entry, and labor market frictions. We show that the ability of the model to replicate key empirical regularities following trade integration---synchronization of business cycles across trading partners and reallocation of market shares toward more productive firms---is central to understanding how trade costs affect monetary policy trade-offs. First, productivity gains through firm selection reduce the need of positive inflation to correct long-run distortions. As a result, lower trade costs reduce the optimal average inflation rate. Second, as stronger trade linkages increase business cycle synchronization, country-specific shocks have more global consequences. Thus, the optimal stabilization policy remains inward looking. By contrast, sub-optimal, inward-looking stabilization---for instance too narrow a focus on price stability---results in larger welfare costs when trade linkages are strong due to inefficient fluctuations in cross-country aggregate demand.
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