Can the Unemployed Borrow? Implications for Public Insurance / J. Carter Braxton, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Gordon M. Phillips.
Material type:
- D14 - Household Saving • Personal Finance
- E21 - Consumption • Saving • Wealth
- E24 - Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity
- G51 - Household Saving, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth
- J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w27026 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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April 2020.
We show that unemployed individuals maintain significant access to credit. Following job loss, the unconstrained borrow, while the constrained default and delever. Both defaulters and borrowers are using credit to smooth consumption. We quantitatively show that long-term credit relationships and credit-registries allow the unemployed to partially offset income losses using credit. We estimate the model and find that the optimal provision of public insurance is unambiguously lower with greater credit access. Using a utilitarian welfare criterion, the optimal steady-state policy is to lower the replacement rate of public insurance from the current US policy of 41.2% to 38.3%. Moreover, lowering the replacement rate to 38.3% yields welfare gains to the majority of workers along the transition path.
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