Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Welfare Effects / Johanna Catherine Maclean, Stefan Pichler, Nicolas R. Ziebarth.
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- I12 - Health Behavior
- I13 - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health
- J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J28 - Safety • Job Satisfaction • Related Public Policy
- J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits • Retirement Plans • Private Pensions
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Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w26832 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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March 2020.
This paper evaluates the labor market effects of sick pay mandates in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 13 percentage points from a baseline level of 66%. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out other non-mandated fringe benefits. We then develop a model of optimal sick pay provision along with a welfare analysis. Mandating sick pay likely increases welfare.
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