Skill and Profit in Active Management / Robert F. Stambaugh.
Material type: TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w26027.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w26027 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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June 2019.
I analyze skill's role in active management under general equilibrium with many assets and costly trading. More-skilled managers produce larger expected total investment profits, and their portfolio weights correlate more highly with assets' future returns. Becoming more skilled, however, can reduce a manager's expected profit if enough other managers also become more skilled. The greater skill allows those managers to identify profit opportunities more accurately, but active management in aggregate then corrects prices more, shrinking the profits those opportunities offer. The latter effect can dominate in a setting consistent with numerous empirical properties of active management and stock returns.
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