Does Workplace Competition Increase Labor Supply? Evidence from a Field Experiment / Amalia R. Miller, Ragan Petrie, Carmit Segal.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- J16 - Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
- J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J33 - Compensation Packages • Payment Methods
- J44 - Professional Labor Markets • Occupational Licensing
- M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w25948 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
June 2019.
This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives worked past the minimum time, but awarding a tournament prize increased work time and effort by over 80% and lowered costs of effort or output by over a third. Effort was similar with alternative (piece rate, low-prize tournament) bonuses. Men worked longer than women in the high-prize tournament, but for the same duration in other treatments.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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