How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing? / Christian Dippel, Michael Poyker.

By:

Dippel, Christian

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w25716.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumbent judges do levy harsher sentences when they are in a competitive re-election campaign, but in states where competition for judgeships is low this does not come to the forefront.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w25716 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	nber w25713 The Patent Troll: Benign Middleman or Stick-Up Artist? /	nber w25714 Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Returns: Time-Varying Risk Regimes /	nber w25715 Do Private Prisons Affect Criminal Sentencing? /	nber w25716 How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing? /	nber w25717 Investor Ideology /	nber w25718 Testing the Effectiveness of Consumer Financial Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Savings Accounts /	nber w25719 Labor Market Power /	Next

March 2019.

Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumbent judges do levy harsher sentences when they are in a competitive re-election campaign, but in states where competition for judgeships is low this does not come to the forefront.