Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing / Peter Q. Blair, Bobby W. Chung.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
- J24 - Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
- J31 - Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials
- J70 - General
- K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- K31 - Labor Law
- L51 - Economics of Regulation
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w24791 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
July 2018.
In the presence of occupational licensing, we find evidence that firms rely less on observable characteristics such as race and gender in determining employee wages. As a result, licensed minorities and women experience smaller racial and gender wage gaps than their unlicensed peers. Black men benefit from licenses that are accessible to individuals without criminal records, whereas white women benefit from licenses with a human capital requirement. Certification, a less distortionary alternative to licensing, generates an equivalent wage premium for white men, but lower wage premiums than licensing for women and black men.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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