The Structure and Performance of U.S. Research Joint Ventures: Inferences and Implications from the Advanced Technology Program / James D. Adams, Albert N. Link.
Material type:
- D23 - Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights
- K21 - Antitrust Law
- L24 - Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
- O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- O38 - Government Policy
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w23734 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
August 2017.
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) are projects that combine the research resources of different firms. A sample of RJVs supported by the U.S. Advanced Technology Program shows that the projects yield revenues that are far less than costs. Related to this point, the RJVs are subject to commercialization delays, loss of intellectual property, and product market competition. Partner firms undertake joint research, but if they commercialize at all, they do so separately, to avoid splitting of revenues from new products. Ultimately, difficulties with the RJVs occur because frequently, firms are potential competitors.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.