Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness / Michael Carlos Best, Jonas Hjort, David Szakonyi.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w23350 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
April 2017.
How important are bureaucrats for the productivity of the state? And to what extent do the tradeoffs between different policies depend on the implementing bureaucrats' effectiveness? Using data on 16million public procurement purchases in Russia during 2011-2016, we show that over 40 percent of the variation in quality-adjusted prices paid--our measure of performance--is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations that manage procurement processes. Such differences in effectiveness matter for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common procurement policy-- bid preferences for domestic suppliers--dramatically improves performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.