Government Debt and Corporate Leverage: International Evidence / Irem Demirci, Jennifer Huang, Clemens Sialm.
Material type:
- F21 - International Investment • Long-Term Capital Movements
- F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- F65 - Finance
- G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
- G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
- G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
- H63 - Debt • Debt Management • Sovereign Debt
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w23310 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
April 2017.
We investigate the impact of government debt on corporate financing decisions. We document a negative relation between government debt and corporate leverage using data on 40 countries between 1990 and 2014. This negative relation holds only for government debt that is financed domestically and is stronger for larger and more profitable firms and in countries with more developed equity markets. In order to address potential endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach based on military spending and a quasi-natural experiment based on the introduction of the Euro currency. Our findings suggest that government debt crowds out corporate debt.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.