Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting / Josh Lerner, Haris Tabakovic, Jean Tirole.
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Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w22768 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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October 2016.
A key role of standard setting organizations (SSOs) is to aggregate information on relevant intellectual property (IP) claims before deciding on a standard. This article explores the firms' strategies in response to IP disclosure requirements--in particular, the choice between specific and generic disclosures of IP--and the optimal response by SSOs, including the royalty rate setting. We show that firms with a stronger downstream presence are more likely to opt for a generic disclosure, as are those with lower quality patents. We empirically examine patent disclosures made to seven large SSOs, and find results consistent with theoretical predictions.
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