Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment / Julio J. Elias, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D47 - Market Design
- D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers
- I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- K32 - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- Z13 - Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Language • Social and Economic Stratification
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w22632 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
September 2016.
Societies prohibit many transactions considered morally repugnant, although potentially efficiency-enhancing. We conducted an online choice experiment to characterize preferences for the morality and efficiency of payments to kidney donors. Preferences were heterogeneous, ranging from deontological to strongly consequentialist; the median respondent would support payments by a public agency if they increased the annual kidney supply by six percentage points, and private transactions for a thirty percentage-point increase. Fairness concerns drive this difference. Our findings suggest that cost-benefit considerations affect the acceptance of morally controversial transactions, and imply that trial studies of the effects of payments would inform the public debate.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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