Identification and Efficiency Bounds for the Average Match Function under Conditionally Exogenous Matching / Bryan S. Graham, Guido W. Imbens, Geert Ridder.

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Graham, Bryan S

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w22098.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: Consider two heterogenous populations of agents who, when matched, jointly produce an output, `Y`. For example, teachers and classrooms of students together produce achievement, parents raise children, whose life outcomes vary in adulthood, assembly plant managers and workers produce a certain number of cars per month, and lieutenants and their platoons vary in unit effectiveness. Let `W\in\mathbb{W}={ w_1,\ldots,w_j} and X\in\mathbb{X}={ x_1,\ldots,x_k}` denote agent types in the two populations. Consider the following matching mechanism: take a random draw from the `W=w_j` subgroup of the first population and match her with an independent random draw from the `X=x_k` subgroup of the second population. Let `beta(w_j,x_k)`, the average match function (AMF), denote the expected output associated with this match. We show that (i) the AMF is identified when matching is conditionally exogenous, (ii) conditionally exogenous matching is compatible with a pairwise stable aggregate matching equilibrium under specific informational assumptions, and (iii) we calculate the AMF's semiparametric efficiency bound.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w22098 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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March 2016.

Consider two heterogenous populations of agents who, when matched, jointly produce an output, `Y`. For example, teachers and classrooms of students together produce achievement, parents raise children, whose life outcomes vary in adulthood, assembly plant managers and workers produce a certain number of cars per month, and lieutenants and their platoons vary in unit effectiveness. Let `W\in\mathbb{W}={ w_1,\ldots,w_j} and X\in\mathbb{X}={ x_1,\ldots,x_k}` denote agent types in the two populations. Consider the following matching mechanism: take a random draw from the `W=w_j` subgroup of the first population and match her with an independent random draw from the `X=x_k` subgroup of the second population. Let `beta(w_j,x_k)`, the average match function (AMF), denote the expected output associated with this match. We show that (i) the AMF is identified when matching is conditionally exogenous, (ii) conditionally exogenous matching is compatible with a pairwise stable aggregate matching equilibrium under specific informational assumptions, and (iii) we calculate the AMF's semiparametric efficiency bound.