Democratic Rulemaking / John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz.

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de Figueiredo, John M

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TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w21765.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

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November 2015.

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.