Image from Google Jackets

Migration and Fiscal Competition within a Union / Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w19282.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Abstract: We develop a stylized EU-type model of a union consisting of rich, capital-abundant and high productivity countries, and poor, capital-scarce and low productivity countries. We address two main issues: the efficiency of tax competition and the effect of factor mobility on the size of the welfare state. We identify a fiscal externality which impairs the efficiency of tax competition. We also demonstrate how capital mobility within the union strengthens the competition over migrants from outside of the union.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

August 2013.

We develop a stylized EU-type model of a union consisting of rich, capital-abundant and high productivity countries, and poor, capital-scarce and low productivity countries. We address two main issues: the efficiency of tax competition and the effect of factor mobility on the size of the welfare state. We identify a fiscal externality which impairs the efficiency of tax competition. We also demonstrate how capital mobility within the union strengthens the competition over migrants from outside of the union.

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Print version record

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

Powered by Koha