Migration and Fiscal Competition within a Union / Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka.
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Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w19282 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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August 2013.
We develop a stylized EU-type model of a union consisting of rich, capital-abundant and high productivity countries, and poor, capital-scarce and low productivity countries. We address two main issues: the efficiency of tax competition and the effect of factor mobility on the size of the welfare state. We identify a fiscal externality which impairs the efficiency of tax competition. We also demonstrate how capital mobility within the union strengthens the competition over migrants from outside of the union.
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