Public Liabilities and Health Care Policy / Kristopher J. Hult, Tomas J. Philipson.

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Hult, Kristopher J

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w18571.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2012.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: Many countries have large future public liabilities attributable to health care programs. However, little explicit analysis exists about how health care policies affect these program liabilities. We analyze how reimbursement and approval policies affect public liabilities through their impact on the returns to medical innovation, a central factor driving spending growth. We consider how policies impact innovative returns through expected earnings, their risk-adjustment, and their timing and defaults through the approval process. Our analysis implies that cutbacks in government programs may raise government liabilities and expansions may lower them. We quantitatively calibrate these non-standard effects for the US Medicare program.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w18571 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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November 2012.

Many countries have large future public liabilities attributable to health care programs. However, little explicit analysis exists about how health care policies affect these program liabilities. We analyze how reimbursement and approval policies affect public liabilities through their impact on the returns to medical innovation, a central factor driving spending growth. We consider how policies impact innovative returns through expected earnings, their risk-adjustment, and their timing and defaults through the approval process. Our analysis implies that cutbacks in government programs may raise government liabilities and expansions may lower them. We quantitatively calibrate these non-standard effects for the US Medicare program.