Global Macroeconomic and Financial Supervision: Where Next? / Charles Goodhart.

By:

Goodhart, Charles

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w17682.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: The overriding practical problem now is the tension between the global financial and market system and the national political and power structures. The main analytical short-coming lies in the failure to incorporate financial frictions, especially default, into our macro-economic models. Neither a move to a global sovereign authority, nor a reversion towards narrower economic nationalism, seems likely to take place in the near future. Meanwhile, the adjustment to economic imbalances remains asymmetric, with almost all the pressure on deficit countries. Almost by definition surplus countries are "virtuous". But current account surpluses have to be matched by net capital outflows. Such capital flows to weaker deficit countries have often had unattractive returns. A program to give earlier and greater warnings of the risks of investing in deficit countries could lead to earlier policy reaction, and reduce the risk of crisis.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w17682 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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December 2011.

The overriding practical problem now is the tension between the global financial and market system and the national political and power structures. The main analytical short-coming lies in the failure to incorporate financial frictions, especially default, into our macro-economic models. Neither a move to a global sovereign authority, nor a reversion towards narrower economic nationalism, seems likely to take place in the near future. Meanwhile, the adjustment to economic imbalances remains asymmetric, with almost all the pressure on deficit countries. Almost by definition surplus countries are "virtuous". But current account surpluses have to be matched by net capital outflows. Such capital flows to weaker deficit countries have often had unattractive returns. A program to give earlier and greater warnings of the risks of investing in deficit countries could lead to earlier policy reaction, and reduce the risk of crisis.