Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Tradeoffs in Making Data Public / Augustin Landier, David Thesmar.

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Landier, Augustin

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w17664.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: Public or partial disclosure of financial data is a key element in the design of a new regulatory environment. We study the costs and benefits of higher public access to financial data and analyze qualitatively how frequency, disclosure lag and granularity of such open data can be chosen to maximize welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of economic frictions. We lay out a simple framework to choose optimal transparency of financial data.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w17664 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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Previous	nber w17661 Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts /	nber w17662 Fiscal Devaluations /	nber w17663 CEO Preferences and Acquisitions /	nber w17664 Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Tradeoffs in Making Data Public /	nber w17665 International Policy Coordination: The Long View /	nber w17666 Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process /	nber w17667 Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the U.S. Safety Net /	Next

December 2011.

Public or partial disclosure of financial data is a key element in the design of a new regulatory environment. We study the costs and benefits of higher public access to financial data and analyze qualitatively how frequency, disclosure lag and granularity of such open data can be chosen to maximize welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of economic frictions. We lay out a simple framework to choose optimal transparency of financial data.