Competition in Persuasion / Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica.

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Gentzkow, Matthew

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w17436.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
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September 2011.

We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.