Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative / Robert T. Deacon, Dominic P. Parker, Christopher Costello.

By:

Deacon, Robert T

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w16339.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

Q22 - Fishery • Aquaculture

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w16339 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	nber w16336 Cross-sectional Tobin's Q /	nber w16337 Two Monetary Tools: Interest Rates and Haircuts /	nber w16338 Unitization of spatially connected renewable resources /	nber w16339 Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative /	nber w1634 Small Countries in Monetary Unions: A Two-Tier Model /	nber w16340 Must Love Kill the Family Firm? /	nber w16341 Scientific Productivity and Academic Promotion: A Study on French and Italian Physicists /	Next

September 2010.

We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers.